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Policy Regarding Tobacco Product Use: A Pro-
posal for Changing from Opt-Out to Opt-In 
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Benedikt M. Quosigk (Kennesaw State University) 
 
 
The University System of Georgia (USG) has a state-wide initiative aimed at increasing the well-
being of faculty and staff by incentivizing a decrease in tobacco product usage by employees 
covered by a USG healthcare plan. This incentive is positive in that aid in stopping tobacco 
product usage is offered to each member; and negative in that each member who is a tobacco 
product user is penalized. A healthcare surcharge is added to the monthly health insurance 
premium paid by each faculty/staff member for themselves and covered dependents over 18 
years of age who are tobacco product users. The current policy considers covered employees 
and their applicable dependents to be users of tobacco products unless they annually opt-out. 
This paper includes summaries of the incidence of cigarette and tobacco product usage in the 
U.S., a summary of USG’s policies related to the current tobacco initiative, a brief literature review 
regarding opt-in and opt-out programs, and a discussion of the possible negative impact of the 
current USG tobacco use policy. Support is provided for the present tobacco surcharge penalty 
being either eliminated or its implementation changed, and for the current opt-out default being 
changed to an opt-in program.  
 
Key Words: Health Insurance, opt-in vs. 0pt-out programs, tobacco product usage, tobacco use 
penalty, sin tax, regressive tax 
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Despite cigarette usage in the United States 
(U.S.) having decreased since 1965 by 67% 
(ALA, n.d.), the use of tobacco products re-
mains a leading cause of preventable dis-
eases (CDC, n.d.). The University System of 
Georgia (USG) has a state-wide initiative 
(Well-Being Initiative, 2020) aimed at in-
creasing the well-being of faculty and staff by 
incentivizing a decrease in tobacco product 
usage by those members covered by a USG 
healthcare plan. The incentive is both posi-
tive and negative: Positive in that aid in re-
ducing tobacco product usage is offered to 
each member; and negative in that each 
member who is a tobacco product user is pe-
nalized. A healthcare surcharge is added to 
the monthly health insurance premium paid 
by each member for themselves and covered 
dependents over 18 years of age who are to-
bacco product users. The current Board of 
Regents (BOR) policy is to consider the 
member and applicable dependents as users 
of tobacco products unless the member opts 
out on an annual basis. That is, the default 
position is that the member is a user of to-
bacco products.  
The authors propose that the default 
option be changed from assuming that mem-
bers are tobacco product users (the opt-out 
option) to assuming that members are not 
users of tobacco products (the opt-in option). 
That is, changing from an opt-out to an opt-
in default. With an opt-in program each 
member who is a tobacco product user or 
has covered dependents over 18 years of 
age who are tobacco product users, would 
be required to opt into the program—annu-
ally declaring by opting-in that they are a to-
bacco product user. Therefore, our research 
question (RQ) is as follows: 
RQ: Is there support for the USG 
Well-Being Initiative changing its tobacco 
use policy from an opt-out to an opt-in pro-
gram? 
In attempting to answer this question, 
this paper proceeds with summaries of the 
rate of occurrence (incidence) of both histor-
ical and current cigarette and tobacco prod-
uct usage in the U.S., a summary of USG’s 
policies related to the current tobacco Well-
Being Initiative, a summary of USG employ-
ment, a literature review regarding opt-in and 
opt-out programs, a discussion of possible 
negative impacts resulting from the current 
USG tobacco use policy, and a conclusion 
which includes a proposal for either eliminat-
ing the surcharge or restructuring how it is 
determined, and for changing the USG to-
bacco use policy from an opt-out to an opt-in 
default.  
Tobacco Use in the U.S. 
As indicated in the selected data included in 
Table 1, the CDC (2018) reported the 2017 
incidence of cigarette smoking in the U.S. at 
15.8% for men and 12.3% for women. For 
age ranges between 35-65, which may 
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roughly approximate the ages of the majority 
of USG faculty and staff, the incidence of 
smoking is 9.0%-18.7% for men and 7.5%-
16.0% for women. In other words, a high ma-
jority of both men and women in the U.S. do 
not smoke cigarettes. Compared to cigarette 
smoking rates in 1965 of 51.9% for men and 
33.7% for women, there has been a notable 
decrease in cigarette smoking. A year-by-
year analysis performed by the American 
Lung Association (ALA, n.d.) of CDC data in-
dicated an overall decrease of 67% in ciga-
rette smoking.   
 
Table 1 
Incidence of Cigarette Smoking (%) in the United States: 1965-2017.  Selected demographics 
adapted from CDC (2018) Table 17 Trends Tables. 
                    
As of November 15, 2019, the latest data 
available, the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report (MMWR, 2019) indicated 
(Table 2) a further decrease in the incidence 
of cigarette smoking to an overall rate of 
13.7%: 15.6% for men and 12.0% for 
 
1965 1979 1985 1990 2000 2005 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Gender            
     Male 51.9 37.5 32.6 28.4 25.6 23.9 21.5 18.8 16.7 17.5 15.8 
     Female 33.7 30.1 27.9 22.9 21.1 18.3 17.5 15.1 13.8 13.7 12.3 
Age (All Males)            
     18-24 54.1 35.0 28.0 26.6 28.1 28.0 22.8 18.5 15.0 14.7 12.0 
     25-34 60.7 43.9 38.2 31.6 28.9 27.7 26.1 23.7 21.3 20.7 19.9 
     35-44 58.2 41.8 37.6 34.5 30.2 26.0 22.5 22.0 18.3 20.6 18.7 
     45-54 55.9 42.0 34.9 32.1 28.8 28.1 25.2 19.9 18.3 19.1 17.5 
     55-64 49.6 36.4 31.9 25.9 22.6 21.1 20.7 18.8 17.5 19.7 17.3 
     >65  28.5 20.9 19.6 14.6 10.2   8.9   9.7   9.8   9.7 10.1   9.0 
Age (All Females)            
     18-24 38.1 33.8 30.4 22.5 24.9 20.7 17.4 14.8 11.0 11.5   8.8 
     25-34 43.7 33.7 32.0 28.2 22.3 21.5 20.6 17.5 15.0 13.9 13.0 
     35-44 43.7 37.0 31.5 24.8 26.2 21.3 19.0 17.0 16.5 15.4 12.9 
     45-54 37.5 32.6 32.4 28.5 22.2 20.9 21.3 18.7 18.4 18.5 15.2 
     55-64 25.0 28.6 27.4 20.5 20.9 16.1 16.5 14.8 13.7 15.0 16.0 
     >65   9.6 13.2 13.5 11.5 9.3   8.3   9.3   7.5   7.3   7.7   7.5 
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women. However, taking into account all 
forms of tobacco usage, which includes E- 
cigarettes, the rates were 25.8% for men and 
14.1% for women. The overall tobacco us-
age was 23.8% for ages 25-44, and 21.3% 
for ages 45-64. On a regional basis, the 
Southern region had an overall rate of to-
bacco product usage of 21.4% which was 
higher than the rates in the Northeast and 
West regions but lower than the rates in the 
Midwest region. Of interest to the present 
study, adults with graduate degrees, which 
would include almost all instructional faculty, 
had the lowest incidence of the usage of cig-
arettes and all tobacco products: 3.7% for 
cigarette use and 8.2% for the use of any to-




2018 Incidence of Tobacco Product Usage in the United States  
 Any Tobacco Product (%) E-Cigarettes (%) Cigarettes (%) 
Overall 19.7 3.2 13.7 
Gender:    
Male 25.8 4.3 15.6 
Female  14.1 2.3 12.0 
Age:    
18-24 17.1 7.6 7.8 
25-44 23.8 4.3 16.5 
45-64 21.3 2.1 16.3 
>65   11.9 0.8 8.4 
Census Region:    
Northeast 17.5 2.2 12.5 
Midwest 23.6 4.0 16.2 
South 21.4 3.5 14.8 
West 15.3 2.9 10.7 
Education (adults > 25 yrs.):    
0-12 (no diploma) 25.9 2.5 21.8 
GED 41.4 - 36.0 
High school diploma 25.2 2.7 19.7 
Some college, no degree 24.7 4.1 18.3 
Associate degree 21.3 3.0 14.8 
Undergraduate degree 13.0 2.2 10.6 
Graduate degree 8.2 - 3.7 
Source: Selected data adapted from CDC Morbidity and Mortality                                                        
Weekly Report (MMWR), November 15, 2019 
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USG Well-Being Tobacco Use Policy 
While the incidence of tobacco product us-
age in the U.S. continues to decline, the 
USG’s 2020 Wellness Initiative includes a 
punitive policy regarding the use of tobacco 
products by faculty and staff. According to 
Chancellor Wrigley, “the goal of the USG 
Wellness Initiative is to increase opportuni-
ties for our employees to participate in a pro-
gram that will assist them to lead happier and 
healthier lives as well as aid in reducing per-
sonal and healthcare costs” (Chancellor’s 
Letter, n.d., para. 3). Currently, the tobacco 
product usage policy is an opt-out program. 
Employees and staff who are covered by a 
USG healthcare plan and who do not use any 
form of tobacco products must certify that 
they and their covered family members, 
which includes dependents who are over 18 
years of age, are not tobacco users. The de-
fault position is that the faculty/staff and their  
applicable dependents are tobacco users. 
The surcharge for family tobacco users is 
$100 per month per person. According to the  
USG’s Tobacco Use Certification Information 
(USG Well-Being, 2020), faculty/staff who 
are deemed (including errors in not opting 
out) tobacco users will “each month . . . pay 
between $100-$300 (or more in some cases) 
in additional surcharges, depending on how 
many people are covered by . . . [the] USG 
healthcare plan. No refunds will be given” 
(pp. 2-3). Consequently, a member with a 
spouse and three dependents over 18 years 
age who are all tobacco users would pay 
$500 per month in surcharges or $6,000 per 
year. Thus, a faculty or staff member who 
makes an inadvertent error in not opting out 
could pay dearly, and this error cannot be ret-
roactively reversed. New hires and covered 
family members who are not tobacco users 
must opt-out within 30 days of being em-
ployed. All other faculty must complete to-
bacco use certification information (opt-out 
or be defaulted in) each year during the 
health care enrollment period (USG Well-Be-
ing, 2020). 
A USG employee who fraudulently 
opts out of being a tobacco product user can 
be subject to criminal prosecution. That is, an 
employee who falsely certifies that they (in-
cluding covered dependents who are 18+ 
years of age) are not tobacco users are sub-
ject to criminal prosecution. The Tobacco 
Use Certification Information specifies the 
false opt-out penalty as follows: 
If you knowingly and willfully make a 
 fraudulent statement to the University 
 System of Georgia regarding your  
insurance coverage, including your 
 status as a tobacco user, you may be 
 subject to criminal prosecution.  
Under state law (at O.C.G.A. Section 
 16-10-20), if convicted, you shall be 
 punished by a fine of no more than 
 $1,000.00 or by imprisonment for no 
 less than one nor more than five 
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 years, or both. (USG Well-Being, 
 2020, para. 11) 
In addition, having been found guilty 
of an ethics violation or a criminal offense the 
policy may subject faculty and staff to disci-
plinary actions including termination of em-
ployment. The ethics policy contained in 
Section 8.2.18.1 of the Code of Conduct of 
the BOR’s Policy Manual requires, in part, 
that “member[s] of the USG community . . . 
comply with all applicable laws, rules, regu-
lations, and professional standards” [empha-
sis added]. In addition, the BOR’s Policy 
Manual (BORPM: 8.3.9.1) in part indicates 
that grounds for the removal of faculty in-
clude “conviction or admission of guilt of a 
felony . . . during the period of employment . 
. . [and] violation of Board of Regents’ poli-
cies . . ..” Under Georgia Code Title 16, 
Crimes and Offenses § 16-11-131 a felony is 
defined as “. . . any offense punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of one year or more 
and includes conviction by a court-martial 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for 
an offense which would constitute a felony 
under the laws of the United States” 
(FindLaw, n.d.). Thus, faculty and staff found 
guilty of lying about their use of a tobacco 
product could potentially be terminated.  
 
USG Employment 
As of fall semester 2019 the USG had a total 
of 49,541 employees. Of this number, 11,851 
were full-time instructional faculty with the re-
mainder composed of 1,550 other instruc-
tional faculty and 36,140 non-instructional 
employees. Faculty members were predom-
inately male (53.8%) and had graduate de-
grees (97.9%). A summary of USG employ-
ment data is presented in Table 3
Table 3.   
USG Employees Fall 2019   
Full-Time Faculty  11,851 
                Gender   
                      Male  6,372  
                      Female 5,469  
                      Other 10  
     Education   
          Graduate Degree 11,599  
          Undergraduate Degree 252  
Other Instructional Faculty  1,550 
     Temporary 479  
     Other 1,071  
Non-Instructional employees  36,140 
Total Employees  49,541 
Source: USG Faculty Data (n.d.)    
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Opt-In Opt-Out Literature Review 
As previously indicated, the authors suggest 
that the USG change their tobacco product 
usage policy from an opt-out to an opt-in pro-
gram. Accordingly, a review of the literature 
was undertaken. This review indicated that 
the published research on opt-in and opt-out 
choices is scant. When presented with a de-
cision, either of the two choices can be used 
as a default option. In theory these choices 
neither affect relative prices nor supply and 
demand. However, outcomes can be greatly 
affected by an opt-out default option as iner-
tia can result in greater participation (e.g., 
McMichael, 2008; Rutecka-Gora et al., 
2018).   As indicated below, many opt-out 
policies are instituted to produce a perceived 
“good” for the individual (e.g., pension or sav-
ings plan participation) or for society (e.g., 
the availability of organs for transplant).   
Inertia, which is defined by Merriam-
Webster dictionary as including an “indispo-
sition to motion, exertion, or change,” is a 
widely accepted phenomenon that affects 
many consumers (Johnen, 2019). The opt-
out system is being used in many areas 
whereby overcoming inertia it directly bene-
fits the consumer. In the case of pension cov-
erage an opt-out option can improve the out-
come for individual employees since an opt-
in system can result in some employees, 
those who fail to sign up because of inertia, 
being left without coverage (Rutecka-Gora et 
al., 2018). On the other hand, Rutecka-Gora 
et al. (2018) suggested that an opt-in default 
comes with implicit fixed or barrier costs that 
can prevent an individual from making the 
most beneficial choice. These barriers in-
clude costs of obtaining information relevant 
to participation and investment choices and 
of becoming knowledgeable about investing. 
McMichael (2008) provided another 
example of an opt-out program being used to 
overcome inertia. The U.S. Department of 
Defense supported an opt-out default for 
their Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)—a plan that 
provided troops with tax-free earnings at re-
tirement. McMichael suggested that through 
an opt-out default sign up process troop iner-
tia worked to their benefit by providing retire-
ment earnings that could have inadvertently 
been lost. That is, members of the military 
were deemed by default to agreeing to par-
ticipate in the TSP. To change their partici-
pation status, they had to opt-out of the plan.  
Much of the literature regarding de-
fault options relate to organ donations. Fer-
guson et al. (2020) argued that in this regard 
an opt-in system presents a free-rider prob-
lem where individuals that have not opted-in 
still benefit from the system. That is, at no 
cost to themselves free riders receive a po-
tential benefit. The larger the donor base, the 
greater the availability of organs. In addition, 
by the free rider not opting into organ dona-
tion, others may be discouraged from 
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registering or may decide to deregister. An 
opt-out system generally has significantly 
more individuals signed up for organ dona-
tions than does an opt-in default (Davidai et 
al., 2012). Stanford|SPARQ (n.d.), a self-
styled “do tank,” suggested that the U.S. 
should change from an opt-in to an opt-out 
organ donation policy. They indicated that 
such a change would increase the U.S. or-
gan donation rate from around 15% to about 
the 90% donation rate found in opt-out coun-
tries. In addition, Shepherd et al. (2014) 
found that “opt-out consent is . . . associated 
with an increase in the total number of livers 
and kidneys transplanted” (p. 10).  
By providing more in short supply or-
gans for transplant, it can be argued that an 
opt-out policy provides a public good. Never-
theless, organ donation is an intimate per-
sonal decision. Due to reasons such as dis-
trust of the medical profession and religious 
objections, many people do not want to do-
nate their organs. Distrust of the medical pro-
fession includes donor questions about brain 
death versus death from one’s heart stop-
ping, and whether non-organ donors might 
be kept alive longer (Wen, 2014). According 
to Bruzzone (2008), “no religion forbids do-
nation or receipt of organs or is against trans-
plantation” (p. 1064). However, some sects 
of Judaism and Islam proscribe directed or-
gan donation and transplantation (Bruzzone, 
2008). Nevertheless, people may still object 
to organ donation based on their personal re-
ligious beliefs. For example, Wen (2014) 
noted that “. . . Catholics are less likely to do-
nate than other religious groups. . .” (para. 
11). Thus, an opt-out policy could indivertibly 
result in organ donations by people who ob-
ject to having their organs taken—a potential 
public injustice that must be weighed against 
the potential for public good.  
In regard to organ donations, a de-
fault also virtue signals or recommends a 
certain action (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
If the default is to opt-out then the govern-
ment has made a conscious choice for its cit-
izens that suggests a best practice, namely 
the donation of organs. This accepted and 
virtuous choice needs no additional input 
from the citizen rather an individual who 
wishes not to donate organs would have to 
make a conscious decision and take action 
in order to opt-out. In the case of making this 
selection when applying for a driver’s license 
several barriers may exist. The selection 
may not be entirely anonymous if the individ-
ual has to communicate the choice to a clerk 
or complete the form in public and pass it to 
the clerk for data entry. Further, the license 
may state the selection publicly, which cre-
ates an additional hurdle to choosing con-
trary to the accepted default. Under an opt-
out system for organ donations, each citizen 
potentially benefits from the organ donations 
of others directly or indirectly. When opting 
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out of the organ donation program one might 
be seen as a “free rider” who may consume 
benefits without incurring any cost.  
Opt-out defaults can also have real 
costs for consumers. In the example of Med-
icaid managed care, Marton et al. (2017) de-
scribed how the auto sign up for Medicaid 
plans benefited neither the system by keep-
ing costs low nor the average consumer by 
covering their needs. Inertia caused most in-
dividuals to remain in their auto assigned 
plans. Only the highest cost individuals 
changed their plans which resulted in ad-
verse selection and individual plan margin 
declines. 
In some instances, however, opt-out 
defaults along with inertia are used specifi-
cally to achieve higher payments while 
providing fewer average benefits, seemingly 
under a profit motive. For example, Bibby 
(1994) described the credit industry practice 
in the United Kingdom (U.K.) of automatically 
selling payment protection insurance policies 
to customers who bought on credit. Credit 
plan protection insurance was sold under an 
opt-out system were the consumer had to act 
(actively indicate no) in order to not be 
charged the extra insurance fee. Consumers 
usually had to tick a small box on their credit 
application in order to opt-out of the payment 
protection insurance. However, most con-
sumers were not aware of this option and so 
unknowingly purchased the insurance. This 
practice was determined inappropriate by the 
Office of Fair Trade in the U.K. and lenders 
were told to switch to an opt-in arrangement 
(Bibby, 1994). 
In another example from Canberra, 
Canada, the practice of mandatory student 
unionism was abolished for an opt-out union 
fee system. The opt-out system was selected 
over an opt-in system expressly for the pur-
pose of keeping memberships and fee reve-
nues at ‘useful’ levels. This change suggests 
that decision makers believed that an opt-in 
default would not collect sufficient revenues, 
and that inertia was counted on to subsidize 
otherwise unsustainable fee revenues 
(“Power play a test for O’Farrell,” 2008).  
 
Estimated Impacts of the Tobacco Sur-
charge Incidence of Tobacco Product Us-
age 
The incidence of cigarette smoking has tre-
mendously decreased over the past 50 years 
(Table 1). In 1965, 51% of males and 33.7% 
of females smoked, while in 2017 only 15.8% 
of males and 12.3% of females smoked. In 
other words, 84.2% of men and 87.7% of fe-
males do not smoke cigarettes.  However, in 
recent years other tobacco products, such as 
E-cigarettes, have become popular as ciga-
rette substitutes. The 2018 incidence of to-
bacco product usage was 25.8% for males 
and 14.1% for females. Tobacco product us-
age in the southern region of the U.S. 
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averaged 21.4% (Table 2). Therefore, the 
vast majority (78.6%) of adults in the South-
ern region do not use tobacco products.  
The level of one’s education influ-
ences the incidence of tobacco product use. 
As indicated in Table 2, adults with a GED 
have the highest rate (41.4%), adults with an 
undergraduate degree have a lower rate 
(13.0%), and adults with a graduate degree 
have the lowest rate (8.2%). As presented in 
Table 3, 11,599 of 11,851 (97.9%) of the fac-
ulty in the USG have graduate degrees and 
252 (2.1%) have undergraduate degrees. 
This data suggests that about 91.7% of full-
time USG instructional faculty probably do 
not use tobacco products: 11,851 total full-
time faculty, less 13% of faculty with under-
graduate degrees, less 8.2% of faculty with 
graduate degrees equals 10,867, divided by 
11,851 equals 91.7%. 
 
Estimated Tobacco Use Surcharges 
The present authors have requested that the 
BOR provide the total amounts of surcharges 
paid by USG members since the Well-Being 
Initiative (2020) was implemented and to pro-
vide information regarding the number of 
USG employees covered by a USG health 
insurance plan. This data has not been forth-
coming. Therefore, in Table 4, estimates are 
provided. These calculations were made us-
ing the following assumptions: 
1. Total number of full time USG em-
ployees at 47,991, which is, per Table 3, 
composed of 11,851 full time faculty and 
36,140 non-instructional employees. “Other 
instructional faculty” of 1,055 were not in-
cluded. According to the USG Faculty Data 
(n.d.) “other instructional faculty” are not full-
time faculty and thus are probably not eligible 
to participate in a USG health plan.  
2. Eighty percent of faculty are cov-
ered by a USG health insurance plan. This is 
a very conservative estimate. Perhaps well 
over 90% of USG full time employees take 
advantage of the health insurance benefit.  
3. Estimated tobacco usage rates of 
20%, 15%, and 10%. The top rate of 20% is 
a rounded estimate based on a weighted av-
erage of 20.4% computed using national sta-
tistics (Table 2) and the gender of fulltime 
faculty (Table 3), which was the only gender 
information available. A rounded upper esti-
mate of 20% seems to be further supported 
by the CDC MMWR (2019) data that indi-
cates 21.4% of adults in the Southern Region 
of the U.S. use a tobacco product (Table 2). 
The low percentage of 10% is a rounded es-
timate of tobacco product usage based on 
the weighted average of 8.3% estimated for 
full time faculty who have undergraduate or 
graduate degrees plus an arbitrary addition 
of 1.7% for staff. The 15% percentage is the 
midpoint percentage. Again, the actual 
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percentage of faculty and staff who use to-
bacco products was not provided by the 
BOR.  
4.  Tobacco surcharge amounts are 
based on one to five covered employees and 
their dependents. 
As shown in Table 4, at a 20% esti-
mated tobacco product usage rate, and de-
pending on the total number of members 
covered, the total annual tobacco use sur-
charges range from $9,214,800 for one 
member covered to $46,074,000 for five 
members. At an estimated 15% rate, the 
range is $6,909,600 to $34,548,000; and at 
an estimated 10% rate, the range is 
$4,606,800 to $23,034,000. Conservatively 
estimating that only one to two covered 
members pay the surcharge and using the 
three estimated rates provides the following 
ranges: $4,606,800-$9,213,600 at 10%, 
$6,909,600-13,819,200 at 15%, and 
$9,214,800-$18,429,600 at 20%.   
 
Table 4 
Estimated Tobacco Surcharges Paid Under Various Assumptions  
*Assumptions: Approximately 80% of 47,991 USG employees (Table 3) are covered by a USG 
sponsored health insurance program: full time faculty (11,851) + non-instructional employees 















(C = B x $100) 
Annual 
Amount 
(D = C x 12) 
Potential 
Totals 
(A x D) 
20% 7,679 1 100 $1,200 $  9,214,800 
 7,679 2 200 $2,400 $18,429,600 
 7,679 3 300 $3,600 $27,644,400 
 7,679 4 400 $4,800 $36,859,200 
 7,679 5 500 $6,000 $46,074,000 
15% 5,758 1 100 $1,200 $  6,909,600 
 5,758 2 200 $2,400 $13,819,200 
 5,758 3 300 $3,600 $20,728,800 
 5,758 4 400 $4,800 $27,638,400 
 5,758 5 500 $6,000 $34,548,000 
10% 3,839 1 100 $1,200 $  4,606,800 
 3,839 2 200 $2,400 $  9,213,600 
 3,839 3 300 $3,600 $13,820,400 
 3,839 4 400 $4,800 $18,427,200 
 3,839 5 500 $6,000 $23,034,000 
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Potential Windfall to Insurance 
Companies 
The present authors have been unable to ob-
tain data from the BOR regarding the amount 
of tobacco surcharges paid by USG employ-
ees. While we believe that the failure rate 
(percentage of eligible employees who inad-
vertently fail to opt-out) is probably small, the 
total dollar amounts of tobacco surcharges 
paid by non-tobacco users can still be signif-
icant. We have estimated the total dollar 
amounts using the same assumptions as in 
Table 4 of 47,991 full-time employees with 
one to five covered members. In addition, we 
have estimated failure to opt-out rates (fail-
ure rates) of 1%, 0.5%, and 0.25%. The ac-
tual rate of USG employees indivertibly fail-
ing to opt-out of being tobacco product users 
has not been provided by the BOR. 
The results, as presented in Table 5,  
indicate that at an estimated failure rate of  
1%, the total dollar amounts range from 
$460,000 to $2,304,000. At a .05% failure 
rate, the total amounts range from $230,000 
to $1,152,000; and at a .25% failure rate the 
amounts range from $115,200 to $576,000. 
Of course, the actual failure rate could be 
higher than 1% or lower than .25%.  
 
Table 5      
Estimated Windfall to Insurance Companies of Employee Inadvertent Failure to Opt-Out as a 














(C = Bx$100) 
Annual 
Amount 
(D = C x 12) 
Potential 
Totals 
(A x D) 
1% 384 1 $100 $1,200 $   460,800 
 384 2 $200 $2,400 $   921,600 
 384 3 $300 $3,600 $1,382,400 
 384 4 $400 $4,800 $1,843,200 
 384 5 $500 $6,000 $2,304,000 
.5% 192 1 $100 $1,200 $   230,400 
 192 2 $200 $2,400 $   460,800 
 192 3 $300 $3,600 $   691,200 
 192 4 $400 $4,800 $   921,600 
 192 5 $500 $6,000 $1,152,000 
.25% 96 1 $100 $1,200 $   115,200 
 96 2 $200 $2,400 $   230,400 
 96 3 $200 $3,600 $   345,600 
 96 4 $200 $4,800 $   460,800 
 96 5 $200 $6,000 $   576,000 
*Assumptions: Approximately 80% of 47,991 USG employees (Table 3) are covered by a USG 
sponsored health insurance plan: full time faculty (11,851) + non-instructional employees 
(36,140) x .80 = 38,393; .01 x 38,393 = 384; .005 x 38,393 = 192; .0025 x 38,393 = 96 
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Estimated Individual Costs 
Failure to opt-out of being a tobacco user can 
result in egregious penalties. Depending on 
the number of family members covered by a 
USG insurance sponsored plan, the monthly 
surcharge is $100-$500, assuming a maxi-
mum number of covered members at five 
(this number could actually be higher). The 
annual amounts range from $1,200 to 
$6,000. While these raw amounts appear im-
pactful, the potential negative impact on  
 
USG employees is perhaps better illustrated 
as a percentage of average salaries.  
The percentages of average instruc-
tional faculty salaries represented by annual 
tobacco surcharges of $1,200 to $6,000 are 
presented in Table 6. The higher the faculty’s 
salary the lower the percentage impact of the 
surcharge. The lowest is 0.76% for profes-
sors at research institutions, while the high-




Estimated Tobacco Surcharge Impact on Faculty of as a Percentage of Average Salaries 
  Average Salaries*/% of Salary 
Type of Institution and Surcharge 







Research Universities $158,190 $116,700 $110,377 $67,199 
 $1,200 (x1) .76% 1.03% 1.09% 1.79% 
 $2,400 (x2) 1.52% 2.06% 2.17% 3.57% 
 $3,600 (x3) 2.28% 3.08% 3.26% 5.36% 
 $4,800 (x4) 3.03% 4.11% 4.35% 7.14% 
 $6,000 (x5) 3.79% 5.14% 5.44% 8.93% 
Comprehensive Universities $89,077 $73,262 $67,473 $51,401 
 $1,200 (x1) 1.35% 1.64% 1.78% 2.33% 
 $2,400 (x2) 2.69% 3.28% 3.56% 4.67% 
 $3,600 (x3) 4.04% 4.91% 5.34% 7.00% 
 $4,800 (x4) 5.39% 6.55% 7.11% 9.34% 
 $6,000 (x5) 6.74% 8.19% 8.89% 11.67% 
State Universities $79,213 $65,382 $60,224 $48,723 
 $1,200 (x1) 1.51% 1.84% 1.99% 2.46% 
 $2,400 (x2) 3.03% 3.67% 3.99% 4.93% 
 $3,600 (x3) 4.54% 5.51% 5.98% 7.39% 
 $4,800 (x4) 6.06% 7.34% 7.97% 9.85% 
 $6,000 (x5) 7.57% 9.18% 9.96% 12.31% 
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State Colleges $72,181 $63,730 $60,211 $46,801 
 $1,200 (x1) 1.66% 1.88% 1.99% 2.56% 
 $2,400 (x2) 3.32% 3.77% 3.99% 5.13% 
 $3,600 (x3) 4.99% 5.65% 5.98% 7.69% 
 $4,800 (x4) 6.65% 7.53% 7.97% 10.26% 
 $6,000 (x5) 8.31% 9.41% 9.96% 12.82% 
 * Source: USG Average Instructional Faculty Salaries 2019.  
 
The present authors have not been 
able to obtain average salaries for non-in-
structional employees. Nevertheless, non-in-
structional members who earn similar sala-
ries would pay the same rates. For example, 
if an instructional or a non-instructional mem-
ber earns $50,000, the range of surcharges 




No matter how one looks at the national data 
presented in Table 2, and assuming that 
USG member tobacco usage is in accord 
with national data, the great majority of USG 
plan members are probably not users of to-
bacco products. Overall, 80.3%, and by 
Southern region 78.6%, of adults do not use 
tobacco products. Breaking the data into the 
demographic areas of gender and education 
provides even larger percentages of non-to-
bacco product usage. By gender, male non-
usage is at 74.2% and female non-usage is 
at 85.9%. By education, for faculty members, 
of whom 97.9% hold a graduate degree 
(USG Faculty Data, n.d.; cf. Table 3), non-
usage is at 91.7%. Therefore, based on na-
tional rates of tobacco product usage, the de-
fault position of opt-out (which assumes that 
all faculty members are tobacco users) is not 
warranted. Tobacco product usage data thus 
supports an opt-in rather than an opt-out pro-
gram.  
With group plans, insurance compa-
nies use group averages to calculate risk-
based premiums (Cogan, 2018). In a given 
year individuals that do not have claims sub-
sidize the costs of those that do. On average, 
younger group members subsidize older 
group members. The tobacco surcharge can 
be likened to the risk adjustment made by au-
tomobile insurance companies based on the 
individual’s driving record. With the tobacco 
use surcharge insurance companies have 
added an individual risk into the member’s in-
surance premium, which essentially de-
creases the beneficial effects of group sub-
sidy. 
The tobacco surcharge can also be 
viewed as a punishment for a certain behav-
ior. Tobacco usage is already curtailed by 
various laws. For example, laws commonly 
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restrict tobacco usage to certain areas. 
Moreover, “sin” taxes have long been im-
posed on the purchase of cigarettes. Federal 
and state excise taxes currently account for 
about half of the cost of a pack of 20 ciga-
rettes. In 2019, Georgia cigarette consumers 
paid a total tax of $13.76 per 10-pack carton 
(Cammenga, 2019). The negative conse-
quences imposed are inherently meant to 
cause behavioral changes that result in less 
tobacco product usage.  
The question arises about other be-
haviors that lead to negative health effects 
and the selective targeting of tobacco usage. 
While tobacco usage has been on the de-
cline, obesity, which was described by 
McCafferty et al. (2020) as a “. . . a public 
health epidemic in the United States. . .” now 
affects 39.8% of the population and is ex-
pected to affect about 53% of the population 
by 2030 (p. 1). Sedentary behavior and ex-
cessive intake of calories, sugar, and alcohol 
can all lead to negative health outcomes. 
Nevertheless, tobacco usage is singled out 
as a punishable behavior worthy of a sur-
charge. Why is there not also a surcharge for 
other forms of health issues that are under 
the control of the member? By the same rea-
soning, should a surcharge not also be levied 
on members based on their self-reported ca-
loric intake, on the number of alcoholic drinks 
they self-report as consumed each week, or 
on self-reported levels of exercise?   
The tobacco use surcharge provides 
a substantial benefit to insurance providers. 
As indicated in Table 4, it is estimated that 
USG members annually pay millions of dol-
lars in tobacco surcharges. How do these 
surcharge payments benefit USG members? 
First, it can be argued that this penalty works 
to disincentivize tobacco use, which is a ma-
jor cause of preventable diseases. By de-
creasing tobacco product usage, both the in-
dividual and society benefit. Second, by 
agreeing to impose this surcharge, the BOR 
was perhaps able to negotiate lower insur-
ance premiums for non-tobacco users.  
While the tobacco surcharge may be 
considered to encourage a social good (less 
tobacco product usage), an opt-in program 
would do the same. Changing to an opt-in 
program would not eliminate the surcharge 
imposed on members who use tobacco prod-
ucts. In addition, if the tobacco surcharge 
was changed to an opt-in rather than an opt-
out program, total amounts of surcharges 
collected by insurance providers should not 
be lessened. Assuming that members are 
truthful in reporting their tobacco usage, 
which is assumed in the current opt-out pro-
gram, insurance providers would collect the 
same revenues. Lying in reporting tobacco 
usage is already disincentivized by the pos-
sibility of the member being criminally prose-
cuted and losing their job. This penalty ap-
plies whether or not the member lies to opt-
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out or lies to not opt-in. Inadvertent errors by 
non-tobacco users in failing to opt-out pro-
duces an ongoing punishment—one that 
lasts for at least a year—since the election 
can only be changed during an annual enroll-
ment period and cannot be retroactively cor-
rected. Hence, insurance providers can sub-
stantially benefit from member error. Such 
errors can be minimized by adopting an opt-
in program. 
Members who are users of tobacco 
products pay a severe penalty. Since sur-
charges are fixed amounts, they dispropor-
tionately impact members with lower sala-
ries. As indicated in Table 6, the lower the 
average salary, the higher the percentage 
represented by the tobacco surcharge—in 
effect, the surcharge can be likened to a re-
gressive tax. Based on type of institution and 
employment level, the tobacco surcharge 
paid by faculty represents 1% to 12.8% of 
their salaries. Similar rates would also apply 
to non-instructional faculty with comparable 
salaries. As previously indicated, a single 
member without dependents who uses to-
bacco products and earns an annual salary 
of $50,000 pays a surcharge that represents 
2.4% of their salary. In comparison, the max-
imum Georgia income tax rate in 2019 was 
5.75%. Are the surcharge amounts fair and 
reasonable? The authors suggest that for 
USG members with relative lower salaries, 
the answer is no; at the very least, the 
surcharge can be characterized as poten-
tially burdensome.  
In addition, members who inadvert-
ently fail to opt-out are, without recourse, 
locked into paying the surcharge for an entire 
year, and perhaps longer if they miss the 
next opt-out opportunity. Notably, failure to 
opt-out results in the surcharge being levied 
on not only the member but also on all the 
member’s applicable dependents. As indi-
cated in the above literature review, opt-out 
programs can benefit the consumer (e.g., 
pension plans, saving plans) by providing a 
valuable benefit; or they can be used to take 
advantage of inertia which results in in-
creased provider revenues (e.g., payment 
protection insurance, increased union fees). 
The USG’s opt-out policy is of the latter type. 
Such surcharge payments—those paid due 
to member error—create a “windfall” for the 
insurance companies—what might be char-
acterized as an ill-gotten increase in insur-
ance company gross margins (Table 5). An 
opt-in program would eliminate tobacco sur-
charges caused by member error.  
Ethics is another consideration that 
should be taken into account in deciding to 
change to an opt-in program. As indicated in 
the literature review, organ donors who may 
be opposed to donating their organs can be 
trapped into agreeing to do so by an opt-out 
program. This adverse effect is often dis-
missed by using a “greater good” argument. 
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The tobacco surcharge is different. An opt-
out program for tobacco product usage is 
more like the example of U.K. borrowers be-
ing tricked into purchasing unwanted insur-
ance. An opt-out program for tobacco prod-
uct usage mainly benefits the bottom line of 
insurance providers. Indirectly, non-smokers 
may benefit (probably minimally, if at all—it 
is unlikely that this windfall is passed on to 
members) through lower premiums from 
member error in not opting out. Even if this is 
the case, is this treatment fair and equitable? 
There is no benefit to non-smokers of being 
charged a tobacco surcharge. Is it the right 
thing to do to severely penalize a member for 
inadvertently not opting out as a tobacco 
user and by so doing secure a benefit for the 
good of the many—perhaps, only secure a 
benefit for the insurance provider? Changing 
to an opt-in policy eliminates the possibility of 
this ethically questionable consequence.   
 
Conclusions and Proposals 
The opt-out assumption that defaults to all 
members being tobacco users is not sup-
ported by national tobacco product usage 
data—rather, the opposite is true. Changing 
from the current opt-out program to an opt-in 
program would not affect insurance company 
revenues—the same amounts should be col-
lected under either approach. Alternatively, a 
‘sticky’ default could be used where an em-
ployee makes a selection once and that 
selection carries forward automatically until it 
is changed. An option without a default would 
also be feasible where a simple yes/no ques-
tion about tobacco usage would be required 
to be answered before a member could gain 
access to the open enrollment portal, essen-
tially eliminating the user error scenario. It 
appears that a major driver of an insurance 
company preference for an opt-out program 
is the collection of revenues from members 
who unwittingly fail to opt-out. The penalty 
paid by those who fail to opt-out is severe. 
Lastly, the ethics of subsidizing premium 
costs by taking advantage of member error 
should be considered.  
In answer to the research question 
(RQ), the authors believe that there is ample 
support for the USG changing their Well-Be-
ing Initiative tobacco use policy from an opt-
out program to an opt-in program. The as-
sumption should be that the member and 
their dependents are not tobacco product us-
ers unless the member affirmatively declares 
differently. The non-tobacco preference 
should become the default for the following 
health plan year. This is similar to the de-
pendent election. Once a dependent is en-
tered, they remain a dependent by default for 
each subsequent plan year.  
In addition, the authors suggest that 
policy makers reconsider the levying of the 
surcharge. Tobacco and cigarette users are 
already penalized by being restricted in 
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where they can use the products. Cigarette 
users already pay high excess taxes— “sin” 
taxes. Moreover, tobacco users are continu-
ally warned by their doctors and through the 
media about the negative consequences of 
their bad habit. Does an additional penalty, 
especially a severe one such as USG’s to-
bacco surcharge, really decrease the inci-
dence of tobacco product usage? Friedman 
et al.s’ (2016) results regarding the market 
place implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA) tobacco surcharges suggest that 
tobacco use cessation is not incentivized by 
surcharges:    
Relative to those facing no sur-
charges, smokers facing medium or 
high surcharges had significantly re-
duced coverage (-4.4 to -11.6 per-
centage points), but no significant dif-
ferences in smoking cessation. 
Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that tobacco surcharges con-
flicted with a major goal of the ACA—
increased financial protection—with-
out increasing smoking cessation. 
(Friedman et al., 2016, p. 1176)  
Moreover, should tobacco product users be 
targeted for a penalty while numerous other 
potentially health-related behaviors are not? 
Surcharges in general decrease the benefi-
cial effects of insurance premiums being 
computed on group averages. The present 
authors suggest that the imposition of the 
tobacco surcharge penalty is a slippery 
slope, which could lead to other surcharges 
being negotiated by insurance companies. In 
the opinion of the authors, the best solution 
is for no surcharges to be imposed. 
Even if the tobacco surcharge pen-
alty is not eliminated, policy makers should 
reconsider the way the penalty is imple-
mented. As currently structured the penalty 
can be severe, especially to members who 
earn relatively lower salaries. The fixed 
amounts of the tobacco use surcharge, like 
excise taxes (e.g., “sin” taxes) and sales 
taxes (Tax Foundation, n.d.), are regressive. 
That is, the less the member earns, the larger 
the percentage of their income that is repre-
sented by the surcharge. As indicated in Ta-
ble 6, the tobacco surcharge penalty can 
amount to a significant percentage of a mem-
ber’s annual salary.  
 
Limitations 
This research was limited by a lack of access 
to pertinent data. As of the present writing, 
the authors have not been able to obtain in-
formation regarding the total number of em-
ployees covered by a USG-sponsored health 
insurance plan, the total amount of instruc-
tional and non-instructional surcharges paid 
by year, and various demographic data for 
non-instructional employees. Therefore, esti-
mates were necessitated regarding the total 
tobacco surcharges paid by members, the 
97
Georgia Journal of College Student Affairs, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/gcpa/vol37/iss1/5
DOI: 10.20429/gcpa.2021.370105
Georgia Journal of College Student Affairs 
 
98 
potential windfall to insurance companies of 
members indivertibly failing to opt-out, and 
the tobacco surcharge impact on faculty as a 
percentage of average salaries.   
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